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Equity in its Relations to Common Law. By William W. Billson.
Published by The Boston Book Co., Boston. 1917. pp. xii, 234.
This work undertakes to set forth what the author believes to be the
real nature of equity and its relations to common law-a subject
upon which both judges and writers have differed greatly. When we
come to examine the views which have obtained upon the matter, we
discover two schools of thought. The point of view of one of these
is stated, although without careful analysis, by Spence in his classic
work upon The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. He
speaks of "that equity which is opposed to . . . law and stands in
opposition to it" and adds: "the principles of Equity, or natural
justice, have sometimes to be applied in contradiction to the positive
law." (Note to Book II, Chap. I. The italics are those of Spence.)
The same view is more dearly expressed in the English Judicature
Acts of 1873-1875, which consolidated the courts of common law and
chancery and expressly provided: "Generally in all matters not here-
inbefore particularly mentioned, in which there is any conflict or
variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law
with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail."
(Subdivision II, Section 25. The italics are those of the present
writer.) As Mr. Billson points out (p. II) the idea that the rules
of equity "conflict" with the common law is, among more recent
* writers, expressed by Pomeroy. (Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction, 2 ed.,
sees. 48-54 and 427.) It seems probable-although apparently Mr.
Billson thinks the contrary to have been the case-that this view was
the prevailing one down to a relatively modern period.
The opposite view, as is well known, was vigorously advanced by
Professor Langdell, Professor Ames, Professor Maitland, and some
others, including John Adams in his Treatise on Equity, Professor
L.ngdell's views will be found in i HARv. L. REv. 58; 13 HARv. L.
REV. 673, 677; Summary of Equity Pleading (2d ed.) 210-211; those
of Professor Ames are indicated in i HARv. L. REv. 9; those of Mr.
Adams in his Treatise on Equity (8th ed.) xxiv and xxix. The follow-
ing passage from Professor Langdell's writings is typical of his views:
"What has thus far been said of rights and their violation has in it no element
of equity. The rights which have been described may be defined as original and
independent rights, and equity has no voice either in the creation of such rights
or in deciding in whom they are vested. Equity cannot, therefore, create personal
rights which are unknown to the law; nor can it say that a res, whch by law
has no owner, is a subject of ownership, nor that a res belongs to A which by
law belongs to B; nor can it impose upon a person or a thing an obligation which
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by law does not exist; nor can it declare that a right arising from an obligation
is assignable, if by law it is not assignable. To say that equity can do any of
these things would be to say that equity is a separate and independent system of
law, or that it is superior to law."
Perhaps no clearer statement of the view that there has been no
conflict can be found than the following by Professor Maitland:
Perhaps you may have fancied that at all manner of points there was a
conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of common law, or at all events
a variance. . . . It is important that even at the very outset of our career we
should form some notion of the relation which existed between law and equity
in the year 1875. And the first thing that we have to observe is that this relation
was not one of conflict. Equity had come not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it
Every jot and every tittle of the law was to be obeyed, but when all this had been
done something might yet be needed, something that equity would require....
"Let me take an instance or two in which something that may for one moment
look like a conflict becomes no conflict at all when it is examined. Take the case
of a trust . . . Equity did not say that the cestui que trust was the owner
of the land, it said that the trustee was the owner of the land, but added that he
was bound to hold the land for the benefit of the cestui que trust. There was no
conflict here. . . . The judicature Act . . . found no conflict, no vari-
ance even, between the rules of the common law and the rules of equity."
This second view is undoubtedly that which has for many years
been taught in a considerable number of our law schools, largely
through the influence of Professor Langdell's teaching and writing.
That it is unsound is the thesis of the author of the work under review.
To the working out of this thesis in detail the book is devoted. At the
outset the learned author laments that these questions "though long
mooted, appear never to have received as systematic discussion as they
deserve, considering how vitally they concern the origin, nature, func-
tions and limitations of equity" (p. iii).
One who is familiar with the literature of the subject is surprised
to find that while Mr. Billson cites many writers, none of whom discuss
the question with the care which its importance demands, there is no
reference to the systematic and thorough analytical discussion of the
whole subject, with a wealth of concrete illustrations, which was pub-
lished by Professor Hohfeld in June, 1913, in the Michigan Law
Review. (ii MICH. L. REv., 537-572. A supplementary article by the
same writer appeared in June, 1917, in 26 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 767,
under the title, The Conflict of Equity and Law.) By means of a
more careful analysis than the matter had previously received Pro-
fessor Hohfeld demonstrated the correctness of the traditional view,
and specifically defended the embodiment of that view in the above-
quoted section of the English Judicature Acts. He also exposed in
detail the fallacies underlying the specific arguments of Langdell and
Maitland, and their followers. This demonstration took the form not
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merely of a general discussion but also of a systematic analysis of a
large number of concrete illustrative cases.
The present work undertakes much the same task. The general
theory of the "conflict" is presented in the first part of the book (five
chapters) ; the second part (three chapters) contains an application
of the theory to particular branches of the law. The book is written
in an interesting and, at times, even picturesque style; but it is less
closely analytical and thorough than the prior treatment of the subject
by Professor Hohfeld. The similarity of view of the two writers is
strikingly shown by the following comparison of their treatment' of
the subject.
We find, for example, that Professor Hohfeld discusses the "origin
and development of equity," "the fundamental characteristics of
equity," the "functions of equity," and "the limitations of the
remedial functions of equity," while Mr. Billson, in his preface,
refers to "the origin, nature, functions, and limitations of equity."
Likewise we find Professor Hohfeld referring to "the dual system
of law and equity," Mr. Billson to "The LaW's Dualism in Rome and
in England." Professor Hohfeld quotes Maitland, Langdell (both in
his Summary of Equitable Pleading and his Brief Survey of Equity
Jurisdiction), and Adams, as leading examples of the more recent
writers declaring that there has been no appreciable "conflict" between
equitable and legal rules; Mr. Billson says: "Of its more recent
expositions the more notable are by Mr. Adams in his recent work
on Equity, by Professor Maitland in his lectures, and by Professor
Langdell in his work on the Pleadings, and in his fragment on
Jurisdiction in Equity."
After his quotations from these writers Professor Hohfeld sum-
marizes his views as follows:
"As against the proposition of these various scholars that there is no appre-
ciable conflict between law and equity, the thesis of the present writer is this:
while a large part of the rules of equity harmonize with the various rules of law,
another large part of the rules of equity-more especially those relating to the
so-called exclusive and auxiliary jurisdictions-conflict with legat-rules and, as a
matter of substance, annul or negative the latter pro tqnto. As just indicated,
there is, it is believed,'a very marked and constantly recurring conflict between
equitable and legal rules relating to various jural relations; and whenever such
conflict occurs, the equitable rule is, in the last analysis, paramount and determina-
tive. Or, putting the matter in another .wa#, the so-called legi4 rule in every
such case, has, to that extent, only an apparent validity and operation as a matter
of genuine law. Though it may represent an important stage of thought in the
solution of a given problem, and may also connote very important possibilities
as to certain other, closely associated (and valid) jural relations, yet as regards
the very relation in which it suffers direct competition with a rule of equity, such
a conflicting rule of law is, pro tanto, of no greater force, than an unconstitu-
tional statute." (The italics here and below are, except in one or. two instances,
those of the reviewer.)
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Again, he says:
"THE CONFLICT OF EQUITY AND LAW: A jural relation may be exclu-
sively equitable,-that is, one recognized and vindicated exclusively by an equity
court. As regards every such case there is a conflict pro tanto, between some
valid and paramount equitable rule and some invalid and apparent legal rule."
In his more recent article, The Conflict of Equity and Law (26 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 767), replying, to Professor Austin W. Scott, Professor
Hohfeld reiterates his
"position that while many substantive equitable rules are entirely consistent with
legal rules, many other substantive equitable rules (i. e., those relating to the
so-called 'exclusive jurisdiction' and 'auxiliary jurisdiction' of equity) are in
conflict with so-called legal rules,-the latter being pro tanto 'repealed,' and
rendered as invalid as statutes that have been repealed by a subsequently enacted
constitution."
Mr. Billson puts the same matter as follows:
'His equity, although thus ostensibly an affirmative, independent right, reacted
upon the faw's actual operation as correctively as a repeal pro tanto, and in so
doing only served the purpose for which it was contrived.
"Viewing the subject in the combined light of law and equity, discarding
fictions, and hating regard to the substance of things, it is clear that from the
time when any principle of law was overgrown by an adverse equity, it was,
to the extent of the equity, virtually annulled in its operation." (p. 73.)
In dealing with the "supremacy of equity over law" Professor
Hohfeld puts the matter as follows:
"In cases of conflict, as distinguished from concurrence, a jural relation is
finally determined by the equitable rule rather than by the legal.
"Since in any sovereign state, there must, in the last analysis, be but a single
system of genuine law, since the various principles and rules of that system must
be consistent with one another, and since, accordingly, all genuine jural relations
must be consistent with one another, two conflicting rules, the one 'legal' and
the other 'equitable,' cannot be valid at the same moment of time; one must be
valid and determinative to the exclusion of the other.
"As a mere practical matter, the equitable rule would ordinarily prove 'tri-
umphant' because of the superior coercive procedure and remedies of the court
of chancery.
"The theoretical finality and supremacy of the rules recognized and sanctioned
by the court of chancery may be regarded as established ever since the year
x6i6,-the time when the notable controversy between Lord Chief Justice CoKE
and Lord Chancellor EL.=SmE in relation to the power and privilege of the
chancellor to issue injunctions against the 'enforcement' of common law judg-
ments was settled by a prerogative decree of James 1. upholding the chancery
jurisdiction.
"While the conflict as to ultimate jural relations may be regarded as having
been settled since the year 1616, the great indirectness and complexity of the
dual procedure involved in vindicating such jural relations continued until, in
more modem times, the law courts and equity courts were amalgamated into a
single system. .... "
YALE LAW JOURNAL
"In regard to substance as distinguished from form, these changes in adminis-
tration have not, for the most part, modified the conjoint operation of legal and
equitable primary rights, or the conjoint operation of legal and equitable remedial
rights: they have simply affected the modes by .which legal and equitable rights
are defined and vindicated."
Mr. Bilison discusses the corresponding matters in the following
words (p. 63 and p. 71):
"Such a conflict is of course less distracting than it sounds. For what it
imports is not an absence, but only a crude method of co-ordination. The con-
flict is not real, in the sense that it involves any clash of different sections of
State force. The finality of the new system is acknowledged, and its method of
asserting its supremacy defined...
"Still again, if we view the relations of the two systems from the standpoint of
substance, what we see, as heretofore pointed out, is law and equity although
formally distinct yet practically fused into some such harmonious whole as a
modulated general rule and its exceptions, the co-ordination of the two systems
being crudely effected, despite their nominal discordance and separate administra-
tion, by the de facto finality of equity's mandates. It thus becomes possible to
mistakenly accredit to an alleged consistency of equity with law, a harmony that
has really resulted from the virtual paramountcy of equity over law. The
original and transitory clash or conflict may be lost sight of, in the substantial
harmony ensuing upon the ascendancy achieved by the equitable view.
(p. 7.)
As a final example of the similar treatment by the two writers of
the various points involved, we may notice Professor Hohfeld's words
of caution in one of the supplemental notes in his original article:
"At this point, however, it may be necessary to guard against misunderstanding.
When, in example 34, it is said that the legal rule is 'annulled,' pro tanto, by
the equitable rule, this refers to the very jural relation under consideration, and
to that alone. It is meant simply that, in the last analysis, Y is under a duty
not to cut ornamental trees.
"As regards that particular relation, the supposed legal rule asserting the
privilege is really invalid. It is, to that extent, only an apparent rule, so far as
genuine law is concerned. But such 'legal rule,' though invalid, may have
important connotations as to independent (and valid) legal rules governing cer-
tain other closely associated jural relations. Thus, e. g., despite the conflict in
question and the supremacy of the equitable rule, it would still be the duty of the
common law judge, in case an action at law were brought against Y, to sustain
a demurrer as against a declaration alleging the true facts of the case. . . .
"Conversely, even though a legal primary right conflicts with an equitable
'no-right,' it would be the duty of the common law judge to overrule a demurrer
to a declaration setting forth such supposed legal right and its violation, and,
ultimately, to render judgment for the plaintiff; and, of course, an execution
sale based on such judgment would be valid. . . . These independent (and
valid) jural relations, though connoted by the original (invalid) legal right in
question, must be carefully distinguished from the latter."
Similar warning against misunderstanding is given by Mr. Billson,
who says:
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"There are, it is true, several circumstances that impart to the claim [of con-
sistency] a certain degree of speciousness. Thus, it must be admitted that as
matter strictly of common law, a common law right was in very truth absolutely
unscathed by limitations imposed by equity upon its use. To carry along our
recent illustrations, the same common law remedies were at the bidding of a
trustee or an enjoined judgment creditor after Chancery's interference as before,
the only difference being the imprisonment he might incur by accepting them.
All that he ever had was a common law right and its remedies, and as matter of
common law he had those still. Some color is thus lent to the idea that equity's
limitations upon the use of legal rights do not clash with or impair those rights,
and are not inconsistent with their continuance and integrity." (pp. 71 and 72.)
So far as the reviewer has been able to discover, Mr. Billson does
not anywhere give a strict classification of jural relations, as does
Professor Hohfeld. According to the latter, as the above extracts
show, all genuine jural relations fall into only two classes: (i) exclu-
sively equitable; (2) concurrent, i. e., concurrently legal and equitable.
What appears to be a third class, viz., "exclusively legal" substantive
relations, must be excluded as involving only those so-called relations
which have been repealed by the supervening and conflicting equity
rules. An understanding of this true classification is essential to a
correct apprehension and solution of legal problems. The older classi-
fication of Story and other leading writers on equity always was inade-
quate and misleading, for the reason that it took no account of
equitable repeals of so-called legal rules. Mr. Billson's general dis-
cussion would, it seems clear, compel him to adopt the same classifica-
tion if he were to work the matter out.
The book is attractively printed and bound, and contains the usual
table of cases as well as an adequate index.
WATER WH3rELE CooK
Yale University School of Law
The Argentine Civil Code, together swith the Constitution and Law of
Civil Registry. Translated by Frank L. Joannini. Published by
The Boston Book Company, Boston. 1917. pp. lix, 732.
The Comparative Law Bureau of the American Bar Association has
again attested its public service by the publication of an English
translation of the Argentine Civil Code. The translator, the late
Frank L. Joannini, had already rendered important service by the
translation for the United States Bureau of Insular Affairs of several
of the codes of our insular possessions. The translaion before us
evidences the valuable supervision of the committee of revision,
Messrs. Eder, Kerr and Wheless. No one who has had experience in
rendering into English the legal concepts embraced in the system of
a civil-law country can fail to appreciate the difficulty of the translator's
task, or be unduly captious in the criticism of terminology.
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The work under review incorporates civil-law terms in literal
translation, such as "prestation," "mandatory," "redhibitory
vices," "tutorship," "benefit of inventory," "fise," "usufruct,"
"paternal power," "revendicatio,. "transaction" (for the
common-law "compromise") and numerous others. Sometimes
the expression is explained in a footnote, at other times the
Anglo-American lawyer will be compelled to bring to the subject
some prior orientation. This method, however, whatever its
weakness, is preferable to any attempt at a free translation, with
its efforts, inevitably misleading and inaccurate, to employ a
complete common-law terminology. Considering the great diffi-
culties involved, the translation is very creditable. Not the least
commendable feature of the work is the excellent introduction by
Phanor J. Eder.
A translation of the Argentine Civil Code is of more than
academic interest to the American lawyer, for the economic bonds
between the Anglo-American countries-especially the United
States-and Argentina are growing stronger from year to year.
Scientifically, the code is not the best in Latin America. It was
drafted by the noted jurist Dalmacio Velez Sarsfield in 1865-68,
and it was adopted by Congress in "libro cerrado" (as a closed
book) without discussion in 1869. With but slight amendment,
it is in force today. It was compiled, not as a synthesis of the
historical development of a people's law, but as a structure
derived from a variety of extraneous sources such as foreign
codes, the studies of jurists, etc., and very largely from the draft
code of Teixeira de Freitas of Brazil.
While a remarkable example of legal codification, it has not
proved uniformly responsive to the practical needs of a rapidly
growing community; but fortunately, a good commercial code
and much judicial interpretation have been helpful in developing
its usefulness. Brazil, which furnished the scholar on whose
foundations Velez Sarsfield built, has finally, after years of dis-
cussion in Congress and the work of many jurists, adopted a civil
code which promises to take rank among the best products of
modern codification, including the codes of Germany and Switzer-
land. Its translation into English, now in course of preparation,
is awaited with interest.
An index of one hundred pages adds materially to the practical
utility of the present translation of the Argentine Code, and the
physical make-up of the book is attractive. It should be heartily
welcomed by the American bar.
EDwix- M. BoRCHARD.
Yale University School of Law
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The Law Applied to Motor Vehicles. By Charles J. Babbitt.
2d edition by Arthur W. Blakemore. Published by John
Byrne & Co., Washington. 1917. pp. cxxvi, 1262.
The author of this book rightly considers that the law is based
upon fundamental principles which are not new, and that the
decisions now rendered with reference to the motor vehicle
merely present the old principles of jurisprudence as applied
to new circumstances. The author constantly keeps this in view
and leads the legal mind to basic principles, at the same time
keeping his work to date by recent decisions. For example,
throughout the chapter on municipal powers, the fundamental
principle that the state is an interested third party through which
public welfare is expressed is adhered to in the exposition of the
basis of automobile legislation.
The scope of the book-by scope I refer not alone to the variety
of topical subdivisions, but to the range of state decisions-is
broad. The book covers all the contractual subjects of the law
in their application to automobiles, citing automobile cases where
possible. Likewise, municipal, law, tort, and criminal responsi-
bility are dealt with. Pleading, practice in negligence cases,
evidence and damages receive a limited space. The decisions
are taken from all states. Viewing the matter from a provincial
point, I should say there are a sufficient number of New York
cases cited to render the book valuable to the New York lawyer.
The statutory basis from which the author works in his treat-
ment of automobile legislation, namely, the Massachusetts auto-
mobile legislation, in no wise renders the book of such a sectional
character as to lessen its value.
Aside from a purely legal treatment of the automobile, the
book is instructive through its forceful way of impressing upon
the reader the completeness with which the automobile has
entered into the social, business and. every-day life of all people,
be they automobile owners or not. Further, it dearly impresses
one with the fact that man sometimes opposes and impedes
progress by subtle reasoning and skilful utilization of precedents
of the law.
The leading cases used are well chosen. The book does not
present a panacea for all automobile difficulties, but is a valu-
able addition to a lawyer's library as a first aid. Its utility is
enhanced by a good index.
OSWALD PRENTIss BACKUS, JR.
Rochester, N. Y.
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Unfair Competition. By William H. S. Stevens, Ph.D. Pub-
lished by University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 1917. Pp.
xi, 265.
Dr. Stevens uses the phrase constituting the title of his book
in a broader sense than that usually adopted by legal text
writers and legal encyclopedias. The meaning until recent years
seems to have been limited, in most cases, to the marketing of
goods by fraudulent methods. This book includes under unfair
competition twelve methods, among which are found such prac-
tices as espionage, coercion, exclusive arrangements, operation
of bogus independent concerns, engrossing machinery, etc. As
many and as varied as are the examples treated, the author
does not pretend to treat of all unfair methods of competition.
The various practices are illustrated chiefly by extracts from
the records of government anti-trust suits. To one not thor-
oughly conversant with the subject, the chapters illustrating the
different methods are intensely interesting, illustrating as they
do the working of "shady" business.
The author agrees only partially, if at all, with the theory
that free competitibn inevitably results in monopoly. He main-
tains that the creation of monopoly by combination is not
countenanced in this country, and would not be possible at the
present time; and, further, that monopoly by elimination-the
only other possibility--could hardly take place without the em-
ployment of unfair competition. He further asserts that the
maintenance of monopoly through superior efficiency is not
feasible for a long period of time because of necessary changes
in men and methods. If, therefore, the privilege of maintaining
monopoly by unfair methods should be withdrawn, monopoly
would fall of itself. The record of the Steel Trust seems to
support his theory.
The book, although written by an economist from an economic
rather than a legal point of view, should prove interesting to the
legal profession.
A. E. HowARD, Ji
Hartford, Conn.
